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Building a Wide Reach Corpus for Secure Parser Development

LangSec 2020

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Debts of Gratitude

Sergey Bratus Peter Wyatt and Duff Johnson, PDF Association Dan Becker, John Kansky and team at Kudu Dynamics Trail of Bits, Galois, BAE and SRI

Outline

- 1. Motivation for LangSec Corpus Development
- 2. Background and Related Work
- 3. Gathering Files
- 4. Extracting Features
- 5. Visualizing Features

Motivation

Who needs files?

- Inducing grammars
- Devtesting parsers during development
- Testing/profiling/tracing existing parsers
 - Literal files
 - Seeds for fuzzing

Motivation

But I have 'wget' and 'curl', how hard can it be?!

Hyperlinks -- noisy, broken...and cycles! Hyperlink graph coverage Javascript rendered pages Connectivity/bandwidth issues Needles, haystacks Coverage, coverage, coverage

Background and Related Work

Related Work

- Govdocs1
- <u>Common Crawl</u>
- <u>Apache Tika's regression corpus</u>

Gathering Files

Two Approaches

- <u>Common Crawl</u>
- APIs

Common Crawl



- Monthly open source crawls of large portions of the web: for December 2019, 2.45 trillion pages (234 TB).
- Available via Amazon Web Services Public Datasets
- Searchable indexes available

https://commoncrawl.org/

Common Crawl Formats

- WARC Web ARChive Format, http headers and literal bytes retrieved (47 TB*)
- WAT Metadata files about the crawl (18 TB*)
- WET Text extracted from X?HTML/Text (8 TB*)
- URL Index files metadata for each URL (0.3 TB*)

Sizes are the compressed sizes for the December, 2019 crawl.

CommonCrawl HttpHeader Information

{date=Wed, 03 Jun 2015 21:34:52 GMT, server=Apache/2.2.3 (CentOS), expires=Tue, 03 Jun 2014 21:34:58 +0000, vary=Accept-Encoding, content-encoding=gzip, x-highwire-cache-cache-control=no-cache, content-disposition=inline; filename="1606.full.pdf", x-highwire-filestream-for=http://pdf.highwire.org/stamped/brain/135/5/1606.full.pdf, x-highwire-cache=no-cache, x-highwire-sitecode=brain, connection=close, content-type=application/pdf, cache-control=no-cache, max-age=0, must-revalidate, proxy-revalidate}

Observed Limitations of Common Crawl

- Files are truncated at 1MB (22% of PDFs in the December, 2019 crawl)
- Detected mime type not available in older crawls
- Scale of the data

Detected Mimes on 200-Status Pages in the 12/2019 Crawl

File Type	Counts
text/html	1,916,642,639
application/xhtml+xml	536,459,845
text/plain	68,596,968
message/rfc822	4,197,870
application/rss+xml	3,503,936
image/jpeg	3,405,543
application/atom+xml	3,292,446
application/pdf	3,275,094
application/xml	1,898,145
text/calendar	1,083,796

Website coverage: one deep dive

Search Engine	Condition	Number of Files
Google	site:jpl.nasa.gov	1.2 million
Bing	site:jpl.nasa.gov	1.8 million
Common Crawl	*.jpl.nasa.gov	128,406
Google	site:jpl.nasa.gov filetype:pdf	50,700
Bing	site:jpl.nasa.gov filetype:pdf	64,300
Common Crawl	*.jpl.nasa.gov mime= pdf	7

Common Crawl Takeaways


Extraordinarily useful for gathering heaps of files No guarantees on coverage of the web Some post processing/refetching required

Web crawling generally: No guarantees of representativeness of files in "typically" offline domains

Common Crawl: How we've used it

- Gathered 30 million unique PDFs to date
- Refetched the truncated PDFs
- Stored provenance (and WARC metadata) in AWS Athena

Architectural Flyby



Custom Crawlers/APIs

- Issue trackers can have non-optimal hyperlink structures
- We've used APIs for Bugzilla and JIRA based issue trackers so that we can query and gather issues with attachments.
- For a handful of sites, we have custom crawlers

Files, files and more files: Issue tracker data

ghostscript mozilla_general ooo poi sumatrapdf libre_office mozilla_pdfjs openpdf poppler tika librepdf ocrmypdf pdfbox qpdf

- 27,000 PDFs (20 GB)
- Post-processed compression/package files:
 - PDFBOX-975-0.zip-3.pdf

Extracting Features

Features, features and more features

- Internal metadata (Apache Tika)
- ClamAV hits (ClamAV)
- PolyFile structural elements
- Error messages, exit values, processing times from standard commandline PDF processing tools: pdftotext, pdftops, pdfinfo, caradoc, pdfid

Status: Extracting Features into AWS

tika-annotate - Apache Tika Annotator

Goal: Generate an extensive set of descriptors for a targeted search of documents and capability test of performer solutions.

Method: Using the python wrapper for Apache Tika, a Java-based content detection and analysis framework.

Why Tika: Capable of extracting metadata and content for 1400 file formats.

Outcomes:

 Successfully scanned and generated the following descriptors (in the table) for the JPL workshop demo documents.



Author	U.S Government Printing Office
PDF Version	1.4
Digital Signature	False
Creator Tool	ACOMP.exe WinVer 1b43 jul 14 2003
Producer	Acrobat Distiller 4.0 for Windows
Application Type	PDF
Number of Pages	4
Number of Annotations	3

Descriptors extracted using tika-annotate with example output

Status: Extracting Features into AWS

av-annotate - ClamAV Go(lang) Annotator

Goal: develop a performant means of scanning and labeling documents for "malicious" documents against known signatures.

Method: use Go as a wrapper around the multi-threaded scanner daemon, clamd \rightarrow rapid scanning of thousands of files.

Why ClamAV: benchmark of a currently-standard tool, another point of comparison for SafeDocs parsers and a helpful document annotation.

Outcomes:

- Works well against a set of malicious JPL emails used as part of the DARPA ASED program (many positive detections).
- Small amount of positive detections against GovDocs and JPL workshop demo documents (little positive detections).
 - We need SafeDocs parsers!



JPL Abuse Malicious En (n=3128)	mails
Signature	Count
Doc.Macro.MaliciousHeuristic -6329080-0	34
Win.Trojan.Agent-5440575-0	26

Documents in Paper Corpus (n=~20000)	
Signature	Count
Pdf.Exploit.CVE_2018_4882- 6449963-0	1

Common Crawl WARC info

	t	common_crawlrec_headers.content-length	67326
	t	common_crawlrec_headers.content-type	application/http; msgtype=response
	t	common_crawlrec_headers.warc-block-digest	sha1:ZM35C0C3SSMGLD43EYE6BK0YSS0J4VVG
	t	common_crawlrec_headers.warc-concurrent-to	<urn:uuid:ffcf9128-27db-4a27-ac48-c4f72c5cce86></urn:uuid:ffcf9128-27db-4a27-ac48-c4f72c5cce86>
	9	common_crawlrec_headers.warc-date	Apr 18, 2015 @ 16:48:53.000
*	t	common_crawlrec_headers.warc-ip-address	69.18.213.152
	t	common_crawlrec_headers.warc-payload-digest	sha1:3CWR2AIVNPJUMV6U6WWDERAHASNUQACG
	t	common_crawlrec_headers.warc-record-id	<urn:uuid:791a172e-9d35-4c08-8a3c-fc207f171fa2></urn:uuid:791a172e-9d35-4c08-8a3c-fc207f171fa2>
	t	common_crawlrec_headers.warc-target-uri	http://www.nyserda.ny.gov/About/Board-Governance/ -/media/Files/About/Board-Governance/Board-and-co mmittee-meetings/BoardAgendas/Board-Agenda-2009De c.ashx
	t	common_crawlrec_headers.warc-type	response

Metadata extracted by Apache Tika

0	tikacreated	Apr 22, 2014 @ 11:18:38.000
t	tikacreator_tool	Xerox WorkCentre 7345
#	tikaembedded_depth	0
t	tikaformat	application/pdf; version=1.6
#	tikainline_attachments_per_page	1
•	tikais_embedded	false
t	tikalang_detected	eng
#	tikalang_detected_conf	0.352
t	tikamime	application/pdf
t	tikamime_detailed	application/pdf
•	tikamissing_content	false
0	tikamodified	Apr 22, 2014 @ 11:18:57.000
#	tikanum_alpha_tokens	261

PolyFile and QPDF keys (for now)

t polyfile__keys

t qpdf__err_txt


t qpdf__keys

/Lang, /MarkInfo, /Marked, /Metadata, /Names, /Pa ges, /StructTreeRoot, /Type, /ViewerPreferences, /DisplayDocTitle, /Length, /Subtype, /IDTree, /Co unt, /Kids, /ClassMap, /K, /ParentTree, /ParentTr eeNextKey, /CM1, /0, /StartIndent, /TextAlign, /C M2, /LineHeight, /TextIndent, /CM3, /CM4, /CM5, / CM6, /SpaceAfter, /CM7, /Nums, /Obj, /Pg, 5, /P, /S, 20, /ID, /A, /C, /Annots, /Contents, /MediaBo x, /Parent, /Resources, /Font, /T1_0, /ProcSet, / PDF, /ImageB, /XObject, /Im0, /Rotate, /StructPar ents, /Tabs, /BitsPerComponent, /ColorSpace, /Dec odeParms, /Columns, /Filter, /Height, /Width, /Ba seFont, /Encoding, /BaseEncoding, /Differences, / notequal, /greaterequal, /space, /FirstChar, /Las tChar, /ToUnicode, /Widths, /BS, /W, /Border, /Re ct, /StructParent, /URI, /, /governancemeetings.a sp, /EndIndent, /ListNumbering, /CreationDate, /C reator, /ModDate, /NCCL_DocId, /Producer, /Title, /NCCL_App, /NCCL_Standard, /NCCL_Status

/A, /Annots, /BS, /BaseEncoding, /BaseFont, /Bits PerComponent, /Border, /C, /CM1, /CM2, /CM3, /CM 4, /CM5, /CM6, /CM7, /ClassMap, /ColorSpace, /Col umns, /Contents, /Count, /CreationDate, /Creator, /DecodeParms, /Differences, /DisplayDocTitle, /En coding, /EndIndent, /Filter, /FirstChar, /Font, / Height, /ID, /IDTree, /Im0, /Info, /K, /Kids, /La ng, /LastChar, /Length, /LineHeight, /ListNumberi


Features, features and more features

An oversimplification of structural hierarchy




Visualizing Features with Kibana

File types: Containers and embedded files







PDF Version by Created Date




Creator tools by year





Histogram of Out of Vocabulary (OOV) %



Sort by OOV% descending

- C	is_em	bedded: false × num_tokens: 100 to 100,000,000 × + Add filter
	oov •	14,415 hits content_trunc
>	1	Harvard Graphics - R49B&WPPRS 000000000000000000000000000000000000
>	1	PII: S0167-1987(99)00092-6
>	1	\$\phi\phi\phi\phi\phi\phi\phi\phi\phi\phi
		W C common-cra

Significant Terms -- What Keys Appear More Frequently in Version 1.7 vs 1.6

```
GET safedocs-document-meta/_search
 Z- {
 3.
      "query" : {
         "match" : {
 4+
 5.
          "tika__pdf_version" : {
 6
             "query":"1.7"
 7*
 8 -
 9.
10
      "size" :0.
      "aggregations" : {
11 -
12-
        "significant_queries" : {
13 -
           "significant_terms" : {
14
            "field" : "polyfile__keys.keyword".
15
             "size": 50.
             "chi_square": {
16-
17
               "background_is_superset" : false
18 -
            }.
19-
             "background_filter": {
20-
               "match" : {
21 -
                 "tika__pdf_version" : {
22
                   "query":"1.6"
23 -
24 *
25 •
26
             "min_doc_count": 10
27 *
28 -
29 *
30 - }
```

```
"hits" : {
10-
11 -
        "total" : {
12
          "value" : 927.
13
          "relation" : "eq"
14 -
        },
15
        "max_score" : null,
16
        "hits" : [ ]
17 -
      3.
18 -
       "aggregations" : {
        "significant_gueries" : {
19 -
          "doc_count" : 927,
20
21
          "bg_count" : 1711,
ZZ -
          "buckets" : [
23 -
24
              "key" : "/DisplayDocTitle",
25
              "doc_count" : 85.
26
              "score" : 98.33224376865637,
27
              "bg_count" : 21
28 -
            3,
29 -
30
              "key" : "/Extensions",
31
              "doc_count" : 47
32
              "score": 88.3233456446408.
33
              "bq_count" : 0
34 -
            3,
35 -
36
              "key" : "/BaseVersion",
37
              "doc_count" : 46,
38
              "score" : 86.4107751674724.
39
              "bq_count" : 0
40 -
            3,
```

Next Steps

Corpora "Publish" issue tracker PDFs Features More tools, more commandline options Analysis and visualization Correlations, clustering of features and visualizations Long term

Corpus minimization (cmin) (thank you, John Kansky)

Questions/Discussion

• Thank you!

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Features, features and more features

An oversimplification of structural hierarchy

