


# LANGUAGE-AGNOSTIC INJECTION DETECTION

Lars Hermerschmidt, Andreas Straub, Goran Piskachev

injections grow on trees



# SHOTGUN UNPARSER

```
1 if (recursive || print_dir_name)
2 {
3     if (!first)
4         Dired_putchar ('\n');
5     first = false;
6     Dired_indent ();
7     Push_current_dired_pos (&subdired_obstack);
8     dired_pos += quote_name (stdout, realname ? realname : name
9                             dirname_quoting_options, NULL);
10    Push_current_dired_pos (&subdired_obstack);
11    Dired_fputs_literal (":\n", stdout);
12 }
```

<https://github.com/wertarbyte/coreutils/blob/master/src/ls.c>

```
1 mkdir "1
2 1"
3 mkdir 2
4 ls | wc -l
```

# WHY DO INJECTIONS EXIST?

- Shotgun Unparsers cause Injection Vulnerabilities

# WHY DO INJECTIONS EXIST?

- Shotgun Unparsers cause Injection Vulnerabilities

*But why?*

# WHY DO INJECTIONS EXIST?

- Shotgun Unparsers cause Injection Vulnerabilities

*But why?*

- Correct Unparser Generators are not used

# WHY DO INJECTIONS EXIST?

- Shotgun Unparsers cause Injection Vulnerabilities

*But why?*

- Correct Unparser Generators are not used

*But why?*

# WHY DO INJECTIONS EXIST?

- Shotgun Unparsers cause Injection Vulnerabilities

*But why?*

- Correct Unparser Generators are not used

*But why?*

- IO is "soo simple", let's just use the core libs

# WHY DO INJECTIONS EXIST?

- Shotgun Unparsers cause Injection Vulnerabilities

*But why?*

- Correct Unparser Generators are not used

*But why?*

- IO is "soo simple", let's just use the core libs

*But why?*



# WHY DO INJECTIONS EXIST?

- Shotgun Unparsers cause Injection Vulnerabilities

*But why?*

- Correct Unparser Generators are not used

*But why?*

- IO is "soo simple", let's just use the core libs

*But why?*

- Core libs don't provide secure input handling

# WHY DO INJECTIONS EXIST?

- Shotgun Unparsers cause Injection Vulnerabilities

*But why?*

- Correct Unparser Generators are not used

*But why?*

- IO is "soo simple", let's just use the core libs

*But why?*

- Core libs don't provide secure input handling

*But why?*

# WHY DO INJECTIONS EXIST?

- Shotgun Unparsers cause Injection Vulnerabilities

*But why?*

- Correct Unparser Generators are not used

*But why?*

- IO is "soo simple", let's just use the core libs

*But why?*

- Core libs don't provide secure input handling

*But why?*

- Lacking Awareness for the problem

# WHY DO INJECTIONS EXIST?

- Shotgun Unparsers cause Injection Vulnerabilities

*But why?*

- Correct Unparser Generators are not used

*But why?*

- IO is "soo simple", let's just use the core libs

*But why?*

- Core libs don't provide secure input handling

*But why?*

- Lacking Awareness for the problem

*But why?*

# WHY DO INJECTIONS EXIST?

- Shotgun Unparsers cause Injection Vulnerabilities

*But why?*

- Correct Unparser Generators are not used

*But why?*

- IO is "soo simple", let's just use the core libs

*But why?*

- Core libs don't provide secure input handling

*But why?*

- Lacking Awareness for the problem

*But why?*

- Core libs don't provide secure input handling

# RELATED WORK

- Language specific static and dynamic analysis: SQLi, XSS, ... are well known
- Language agnostic dynamic aka fuzzing: Parsers are known to be broken
- AUTOGRAM uses dynamic taint tracking: Grammar reconstruction from a given parser

Our contribution: Language agnostic detection of injections for textual languages

Awareness

Detection is never complete; Use a constructive approach like [McHammerCoder](#) to solve the injection problem.

# THE SOLUTION

*Show, don't tell*


# PROBLEM SPACE

- Detecting unparsers
- **Identifying injections in a given unparser**
- Generate attacks
- Extract full grammar




# APPROACH OVERVIEW


- Guided fuzzing using language keyword information
- Keywords are extracted from unparse trees (UPTs)
- UPTs are inferred automatically using dynamic program analysis




# UPT INFERENCE




# UPT INFERENCE




# UPT INFERENCE



# UPT INFERENCE




# UPTS AND KEYWORDS



- Keywords have no origin in any input
- They are created by the unparser
- Their location in the UPT shows where (structurally) they are valid in the language

# FUZZING

- generate targeted injection candidates based on keywords
  - example: "break out" of string-enclosing quotation marks
- evaluate injection success by comparing parse trees
  - run both original input and modified input through unparser-parser round-trip
  - compare structures of resulting parse trees
    - if the parse tree changed, an injection was found



# RESULTS

- Promising results in case studies
  - very accurate UPTs
  - found (implanted) injection vulnerabilities
  - structural keyword information can significantly improve fuzzing
  - caveat: not a quantitative evaluation
- Fuzzing automatically yields PoC exploits



# KEY OBSERVATIONS

- "Recursive descent unparsers" exist
  - common in ad-hoc implementations
- Difference to Taint Tracking:
  - leveraging **structural** information to identify keywords and their scope
- Requires structural variability in unparser outputs
  - poor UPTs in "template-based" unparsers
  - reduced to common taint tracking
  - better use a sample output for mutation fuzzing

# CONCLUSION

## Language-agnostic Injection Detection

- works for recursive descent unparsers
- use keywords from UPTs in fuzzing

## Awareness

- Creating output is not just writing an array of bytes
- Injections might exist in all your unparsers

## Call to Action

Every programming language's core library deserves  
an (un)parser

# QUESTIONS?

Lars: [@bob5ec](#) on Twitter

Andreas: [andy@strb.org](mailto:andy@strb.org)

[MARGOTUA code on GitHub](#)